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INTRODUCTION

While the Supreme Court's holding in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery
II)l-that agencies have discretion about whether to articulate new policy
legislatively or adjudicatively-was not particularly earth shattering, the2
decision did generate a great deal of scholarly commentary and criticism.
* Professor of Law & Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville,
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University.
1. 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947).
2. See, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72
VA. L. REV. 297, 325-34 (1986) (suggesting that states should choose rulemaking over
formal adjudication); Cornelius J. Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National
Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1961) (criticizing the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) for not exercising its rulemaking powers enough); Glen 0.
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 486 (1970)
(recognizing broad concern that agencies engage in adjudication at the expense of
rulemaking); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 922 (1965) (questioning
agencies' choice of weapons in making policy); Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and
OtherSources of Law in an Executive Department:Reflections on the InteriorDepartment's
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Much of this commentary criticized the holding in the case, extolled the
virtues of legislative procedures for making rules, and urged courts to
encourage administrative agencies to articulate policy legislatively. 3 As a
result, Chenery II qualifies as our most underrated administrative law
decision.
While we do not disagree with those commentators who have argued that
agencies generally should strive to articulate policy via rulemaking and
avoid creating broadly applicable rules in an adjudication, we believe that
Chenery II was correctly decided 4 and inevitable. Indeed, adjudicative
policymaking is an inherent aspect of an effective regulatory regime. This
Article will discuss how a different decision in Chenery II would have
affected the administrative process both in look and function. In our
opinion, a different holding would have impeded the process significantly.
First, we will describe Chenery I and Chenery II. Then, we will explain
why the decision was inevitable and why we think the Court arrived at the
correct result. These discussions will explain why we regard Chenery II as
one of the most underrated administrative law decisions.
I. THE PREFERABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES

Agencies have a "[m]enu of [p]olicymaking [florms" available to them,5
including the authority to promulgate legislative rules, conduct
adjudications, and articulate non-legislative policies.6 Generally, when
agencies decide to create broad, prospective rules, legislative procedures
are preferable.7 In some respects, legislative procedures, particularly notice
Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1974) (reviewing the
Department of Interior's choices between rulemaking and adjudication in implementing the
General Mining Law); Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty Year Retrospective, 40
ADMIN. L. REV. 161, 161 (1988) [hereinafter Weaver, Retrospective] (discussing Chenery
/!'s controversial nature and its impact on agencies and courts); J. Skelly Wright, The
Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
375, 376 (1974) (suggesting that agencies must engage in rulemaking and not adjudication
when Congress has adopted a regulatory solution). See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS
& RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.7 at 260-62 (3d ed. 1994).
3. See, e.g., Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995,
1006-07 (2005) (arguing that Chenery II has led to administrative inconsistency); M.
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 30 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 15, 16
(2004) ("Whatever its scope, the Chenery principle is a puzzle because it appears to be out
of step with judicial review of other agency exercises of discretion."); Colin Diver, Policy
Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 403-04 (1981) ("[T]he typical
adjudication is not well suited to serve as a springboard for expansive policymaking.").
4. Russell L. Weaver, An APA Provision on Nonlegislative Rules?, 56 ADMIN. L. REV.
1179, 1185 (2004) [hereinafter Nonlegislative Rules].
5. M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1386 (2004).
6. See id. at 1386-89 (detailing the policymaking instruments available to agencies).
7. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.8, at 368 (4th ed.
2002) (recognizing the "near unanimity" of parties praising the virtues of rulemaking);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.18, at 217 (3d ed. 1991) (opining that

2006]

THE DEVELOPMENT OFFEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

817

and comment procedures (informal procedures), are superior to
adjudicative procedures for rule creation because informal procedures are
designed to allow interested individuals and entities the opportunity to join
and influence the rulemaking process. 8 Agencies must publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NOPR) in the Federal Register,9 must allow
interested parties the opportunity to comment on the NOPR,' ° and must
consider and explain their response to these comments."' Through these
processes, informal procedures "force important issues into full public
display and in that sense make for more responsible administrative
action."'12 Public participation necessarily improves the regulatory process.
As Justice Douglas recognized:
Agencies discover that they are not always repositories of ultimate
wisdom; they learn from the suggestions of outsiders and often benefit
from that advice.
The
This is a healthy process that makes a society viable.
multiplication of agencies and their growing power make them more and
more remote from the people affected by what they do and make more
likely the arbitrary exercise of their powers. Public airing of problems
through rule making makes the bureaucracy more responsive to public
needs and is an important brake on the growth of absolutism in the
regime that now governs all of us.1 3
The adjudicative process, by contrast, lacks the public notice and

comment provisions of informal procedures.' 4 Policy, therefore, is created
during a case where only the parties participate' 5 and where little
opportunity exists for public discussion, input, and debate. Moreover,
rulemaking is fairer than case-by-case adjudication).
8. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 217 (noting the "informed" nature of comments).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000).
10. Id. § 553(c).
11. Id.
12. Justice Douglas argued that:
The rule-making procedure performs important functions. It gives notice to an
entire segment of society of those controls or regimentation that is forthcoming. It
gives an opportunity for persons affected to be heard. Recently the proposed Rules
of the Federal Highway Administration governing the location and design of
freeways were put down for a hearing; and the Governor of every State appeared or
sent an emissary. The result was a revision of the Rules before they were
promulgated.
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 777 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
13. Id. at 777-78 (citations omitted).
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) ("[O]rder means the whole or part of a final disposition ...
other than rule making ....); id. § 553(b)-(c) ("General notice of proposed rule making
shall be published ...[and] the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of written data.") (emphasis added).
15. Nonlegislative Rules, supra note 4, at 1184. An agency may permit broader
participation. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 931 (footnotes omitted) ("The device of the brief
of amicus curiae, which has become increasingly common in Supreme Court proceedings,
has also been used by administrative agencies.").
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because a notice of adjudication need not be published in the Federal
Register, interested parties may not be aware that an agency is considering
a particular issue in an adjudicative proceeding. Thus, at least in theory,
informal procedures will lead to better, more informed rules.

II. CHENERYI& II: THE DECISIONS
Despite the advantages of informal procedures, Chenery II illustrates that
legislative procedures are not always preferable or the most effective way
to produce rules. In Chenery 116 a public utility company sought to
reorganize and to issue preferred stock to the company's officers and
directors. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had to
approve such a reorganization plan. The governing act, the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, only provided that such reorganizations
had to be "fair and equitable" to the persons affected thereby.' 7 The statute
did not indicate whether officers and directors could purchase preferred
stock during reorganization. As a result, the SEC had to decide that issue
in the context of the application for reorganization. The SEC approved the
plan, but required that it be rewritten to require the company to buy back
management's preferred stock.1 8 The company subsequently appealed this
decision. The Court invalidated the agency order because the SEC had not
provided a valid, legal reason for its decision.' 9 Instead, the SEC had based
its decision on an erroneous understanding of common law. 20 In so
holding, the Court "explicitly recognized the possibility that the [SEC]
might have promulgated a general rule dealing with this problem under its
statutory rule-making powers.. ..,,21The Court remanded the case to give

16. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
17. The Act provided, in relevant part, that:
Section 7 ...(d) If the requirement of subsections (c) and (g) are satisfied, the
Commission shall permit a declaration regarding the issue or sale of a security to
become effective unless the Commission finds that... (6) the terms and conditions
of the issue or sale of the security are detrimental to the public interest or the
interest of investors or consumers. (e) If the requirements of subsection (g) of this
section are satisfied, the Commission shall permit a declaration to become effective
regarding the exercise of a privilege or right to alter the priorities, preferences,
voting power, or other rights of the holders of an outstanding security unless the
Commission finds that such exercise of such privilege or right will result in an
unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power among holders of the securities of
the declarant or is otherwise detrimental to the public interest or the interest of
investors or consumers.
15 U.S.C. § 79g (1946). Section II contained similar provisions. See id. § 79k (stipulating
that the Commission must ensure that voting power is fairly and equitably distributed
among the holders of securities).
18. Cheneryl, 318 U.S. at 85.
19. Id.at 95.
20. Id. at 88-90.
21. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 11), 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947).
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the agency an opportunity to better explain its decision. According to the
Court, "We must know what a decision22 means before the duty becomes
ours to say whether it is right or wrong."
On remand, the SEC provided a different rationale, but reached the same
result,23 and the utility company again appealed. Relying on the Court's
prior statements suggesting that the SEC might have acted legislatively, the
company argued that the agency's rule had to be prospective and without
retroactive effect.24 As a result, the company argued that the SEC must
approve the company's reorganization plan and, if the SEC wanted to
prohibit management from benefiting from such reorganizations, then the
agency needed to craft such a rule via its legislative powers.
In Chenery II, the Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice
Murphy 25 rejected the argument that the agency had to approve the
proposed transaction and prohibit all future actions of that kind via
legislative rulemaking2 6 The Court stated:
It is true that our prior decision explicitly recognized the possibility that
the Commission might have promulgated a general rule dealing with this
problem under its statutory rule-making powers ....
But we did not
mean to imply thereby that the failure of the Commission to anticipate
this problem and to promulgate a general rule withdrew all power from

that agency to perform its statutory duty in this case .... 27
Such a holding would "stultify the administrative process" and "exalt
form over necessity. 28 In so holding, however, Chenery II recognized that
informal procedures are generally preferable to adjudicative procedures for
creating rules 29 and suggested 30 that agencies should prefer them to

adjudicative procedures.3 1 In the Court's view, the gaps in the Act should
be filled, as much as possible, through this kind of prospective quasilegislative rule promulgation process.32 But the Court also recognized that
it would be impossible for a rational administrative process to function

22. Id. at 197.
23. Id. at 196.
24. Id. at 200.
25. Justice Murphy had joined the dissent in Chenery I. The dissent would have upheld
the SEC's order as a valid exercise of the powers delegated to it. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 99100 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Act conferred wide powers to evolve policy
standards, which potentially may be accomplished on a case-by-case basis).
26. See Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202 (suggesting that to hold otherwise would render the
administrative process inflexible).
27. Id. at 201-02 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 202.
29. Id.
30. NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966) (characterizing
the Court's holding in Chenery 11 as a "rather pointed hint").
31. Chenery 11, 332 U.S. at 201.
32. Id. at 202.
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Such a rigid requirement would make the

administrative process inflexible and unable to address specialized
problems as they arose.34
Chenery II's facts demonstrate why adjudicative rules are necessary.
The Court considered whether the SEC should have approved the
reorganization simply because it had not previously promulgated a rule
prohibiting the preferred stock transfer. One of the dissenters in Chenery II
made that argument. 35 But how the SEC could have approved the
reorganization without a prior authorizing rule is unclear. Differently
stated, it is unclear why "authorization" would have been permissible while
"rejection" was impermissible.36 Could authorization be justified on the
basis that no one would be aggrieved by an "authorization," while the
company's officers and directors would be adversely affected by a
rejection? 37 The difficulty is that, if in fact the reorganization were "unfair
and inequitable," then existing shareholders would be harmed if the SEC
approved it. 38 Thus, the plain meaning of the statute obligated the SEC to
reject the reorganization after finding that the shareholders would be hurt in
this situation.39
Perhaps, in the absence of a prior rule, the SEC could have refused to act
at all-to neither approve nor disapprove the plan. But what would have
happened then? Would the company have been free to reorganize, or would
it have had to sue to force the agency to act? What about the rights of
existing shareholders? Would they have been ignored? Ultimately, the
dispute probably would have ended up in court. "When a court is
confronted by an ambiguous regulatory scheme and searches for an answer
33. Id. at 201-02; see also Boesche v. Udall, 303 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1962), affd,
373 U.S. 472 (1963).
34. Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202.
35. Justice Jackson, who had joined the majority opinion in Chenery I, argued in
Chenery II that the SEC had no legal basis for its action. Chenery I, 332 U.S. at 212-13
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
36. See Weaver, Retrospective, supra note 2, at 170 (providing some of the arguments
relied upon in this section).
37. Id.
38. The SEC found reason for concern, and articulated the same in Chenery I. In its
view,
[T]he amended plan would involve the issuance of securities on terms 'detrimental
to the public interest or the interest of investors' contrary to §§ 7(d)(6) and 7(e),
and would result in an 'unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power' among
the Federal security holders within the meaning of § 7(e). It was led to this result
"not by proof that the intervenors [Federal's management] committed acts of
conscious wrongdoing but by the character of the conflicting interests created by
the intervenors" program of stock purchases carried out while plans for
reorganization were under consideration.
Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 204.
39. Id. at 201-02 ("[I]f the Commission rightly felt that the proposed amendment was
inconsistent with those standards, an order giving effect to the amendment merely because
there was no general rule or regulation covering the matter would be unjustified.").
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to an interpretive problem, it is quite natural for the court to seek guidance
from the responsible administrative agency., 40 Were the SEC to provide
guidance about the issue, whether by legislative rule or nonlegislative rule,
a court likely would defer to this guidance. 4' Thus, courts could not have
decided the issue absent agency input. At some point, then, the agency had
to develop policy. In this case, the adjudicative context was the best place
to develop such a fact-specific policy.
Justice Jackson argued in his dissent that there was no legal basis for the
SEC's action and that the agency had effectively and impermissibly created
a new rule that applied only to the facts of this case. 42 Although Justice
Jackson was correct in his belief that the SEC had created a new "rule" that
applied only in this case, he was incorrect in arguing that the SEC had no
legal basis for its action. In fact, the legal basis for the SEC's ruling was
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 43 which specifically prohibited
"unfair and inequitable reorganizations." Of course, the Act was not as
detailed as it might have been, and more specific rules, whether from
Congress or from the agency, would have been helpful. Nevertheless, the
SEC did have a legal basis for its action. Therefore, the company had
notice, via the statute, that what it contemplated might violate the act.
45
44
Despite extensive scholarly commentary and Chenery H's dicta
extolling the virtues of the legislative procedures over adjudicative
procedures for the development of rules, the Court has consistently
allowed 46 agencies to choose whether to articulate "rules" legislatively or
40. Weaver, NonlegislativeRules, supra note 4, at 1186.
41. The appropriate level of deference, Skidmore or Chevron, is not relevant to this
analysis. In any event, we are not convinced that there is a clear distinction. Id.
42. See Chenery II, 332 U.S at 215 (emphasis added) (suggesting that the agency
overstepped its boundaries).
43. See supra note 17 (quoting relevant portions of the Act).
44. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, § 4.18, at 216-17; Pierce, supra note 7, § 6.8, at
368.
45. In Chenery II, the Supreme Court stated that:
Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law
prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers, it has less reason to
rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the
framework of the Holding Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices
of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative
promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.
332 U.S. at 202.
46. In one case, the Court did require an agency to use its rulemaking authority. In
Morton v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that the Bureau of Indian Affairs' attempt to create
a new rule adjudicatively was invalid.
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and
funded program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. In the area of Indian
affairs, the Executive has long been empowered to promulgate rules and policies,
and the power has been given explicitly to the Secretary and his delegates at the
BIA. This agency power to make rules that affect substantial individual rights and
obligations carries with it the responsibility not only to remain consistent with the
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adjudicatively.4 7
Indeed, in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,4 8 the Court faced the question
of whether an agency could develop a "rule" with only prospective effect
via adjudication. The case involved the so-called Excelsior rule,49 which
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had developed in an earlier
adjudication. 50 At the time the rule was crafted, the agency indicated that
the rule would apply only to "elections... subsequent to 30 days from the
date of this Decision., 51 A majority of the Supreme Court (the plurality
plus the dissenters) concluded that the rule was invalid.
These justices
expressed concern that "[t]he Board did not even apply the rule it made [in
Excelsior] to the parties in that adjudicatory proceeding., 53 However, on
closer analysis, this concern makes little sense because there are arguments
against discouraging agencies from applying adjudicatory policy only
prospectively.
In many instances, "prospectivity performs a useful
function. One asserted deficiency of adjudicative rules is that they can be
applied retroactively, to the detriment of those who have legitimate,
contrary expectations., 54 If an agency applied a "rule" prospectively, this
governing legislation, but also to employ procedures that conform to the law. No
matter how rational or consistent with congressional intent a particular decision
might be, the determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by the
dispenser of funds.
415 U.S. at 231-32 (1974) (footnotes and citations omitted).
47. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-95 (1974) (leaving the agency
to decide whether to proceed legislatively or by "ad hoc" adjudication).
48. 394 U.S. 759, 762 (1969).
49. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
The rule from this
adjudication required employers, whenever a consent election or a directed election was to
be held, to file an "election eligibility list" containing the names and addresses of all eligible
voters.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1240 n.5.
52. Justice Fortas, writing for the plurality, argued that the NLRB had used improper
procedures when it originally created the rule. Wyman-Gordon, Co., 394 U.S. at 764-65.
The two dissenting justices agreed. Id. at 779 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan,
however, argued that prospectivity derogates the agency's informal rulemaking function.
Id. at 781 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He further argued that an agency chooses to apply a rule
prospectively when "it represents such a departure from preexisting understandings that it
would be unfair to impose the rule upon the parties in pending matters," and it "is precisely
in these situations, in which established patterns of conduct are revolutionized, that
rulemaking procedures perform... their vital functions .. " Id. He therefore would have
struck down the original Excelsior rule as well as its application in Wyman-Gordon. Id. at
783.
53. Id. at 765
54. Weaver, Retrospective, supra note 2, at 181-82. One commentator stated that:
One of the most serious adverse effects of using the adjudicatory process for agency
law making is the retroactive effect upon parties who legitimately relied upon the prior
state of the law, or had no advance notice of the new law suddenly declared by the
agency as a basis for its decision in their cases. Of course, courts make retroactive
policy changes in the course of adjudications. However, unlike agencies, courts have
no optional substantive rulemaking powers.
Bonfield, supra note 2, at 330 (footnotes omitted).
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problem might be overcome such that regulated entities subject to the
"rule" in the future would receive fair warning before the "rule" was
applied. Courts have used prospectivity for years 55-beginning with the
Supreme Court's holding in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil
57
56
& Refinery Co. -to counter the adverse effects of retroactivity.
Whether there is a principled reason preventing agencies from doing the
same remains to be seen.
In any event, although a majority of the justices would have invalidated
the rule, the Court ultimately required Wyman-Gordon to comply with the
NLRB's order. This unusual result occurred because the plurality
concluded that even though the rule was invalid, the NLRB had directed
Wyman-Gordon to comply as part of the adjudicatory proceeding.5 8
Wyman-Gordon's teachings are opaque, at best, because it did not
establish the primacy of legislative rulemaking. The holding also placed
few, if any, restraints on an agency's authority to create "rules"
adjudicatively. On the contrary, the result encouraged agencies to view
legislative and adjudicative procedures simply as alternative methods. 59 At
55. Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal,61
VA. L. REv. 1557, 1612 (1975).
56. 287 U.S. 358, 363-65 (1932).
57. See Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237, 241 (D.C. Cir.
1960) ("[A]s a matter of equitable discretion, courts will apply a judgment overruling a prior
decision only prospectively in order to avoid 'gross injustice."'); NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 195 F.2d 141, 148-49 (9th Cir. 1952) ("Courts, in making ad hoc adjudications,
regularly apply rules and doctrines not previously announced, to prior conduct of the parties.
On occasions they have chosen to exercise an inherent power to give their pronouncements
prospective operation only, but they are not required by any constitutional limitation to do
so .. ") (footnotes omitted); United States ex rel. Almeida v. Rundle, 255 F. Supp. 936,
949-50 & n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 863
(1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969); see also Weaver, Retrospective, supra note 2, at
181-82 & n.78 (citing NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, Inc., 406 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968))
("[T]here is nothing anomalous about a prospective change in a legal rule occurring in an
adjudicatory setting. In all fairness sufficient time may be required to permit persons to
change systems and modes of dealing with one another.").
58. The plurality argued that:
In the present case, however, the respondent itself was specifically directed by the
Board to submit a list of the names and addresses of its employees for use by the
unions in connection with the election. This direction, which was part of the order
directing that an election be held, is unquestionably valid. Even though the
direction to furnish the list was followed by citation to "Excelsior Underwear,Inc.,
156 N.L.R.B. No. 111," it is an order in the present case that the respondent was
required to obey. Absent this direction by the Board, the respondent was under no
compulsion to furnish the list because no statute and no validly adopted rule
required it to do so.
Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 766 (citation and footnotes omitted).
59. Justice Black, concurring in Wyman-Gordon, argued that adjudicatory procedures
are an alternate method of creating rules and that an agency is free to use whichever method
it chooses.
[S]o long as the matter involved can be dealt with in a way satisfying the definition
of either "rulemaking" or "adjudication" under the Administrative Procedure Act,
that Act... should be read as conferring upon the Board the authority to decide,
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least in theory, agencies should not create generally applicable rules in an
adjudication if the rules do not apply in the cases in which they are created.
But Wyman-Gordon allowed the NLRB to do exactly that. After WymanGordon, even if a "rule" is prospectively announced in an adjudicative
decision, it appears that there is nothing to prevent the agency from
applying that "rule" in future cases.
III. THE CORRECTNESS AND INEVITABILITY OF THE CHENERYIlDECISION

Whether the Wyman-Gordon holding was correct is not the focus of this
paper. The short answer to the question of whether the Court in Chenery II
could have or should have held that agencies are only allowed to articulate
policy legislatively and not adjudicatively is "No." "[C]ourts are poorly
situated to distinguish between circumstances appropriate for rulemaking
and circumstances appropriate for [adjudication]. 6 ° Moreover, requiring
agencies to articulate policy only via legislative procedures would be both
impractical and unworkable. Such a holding would cripple the regulatory
process. If the Court had adopted that requirement in Chenery II, there
would have been unexpected consequences including futility and
administrative inflexibility.
First, such a requirement would promote futility. Agencies can neither
conceive of every possible rule in advance, nor draft all regulations to
ensure that they are not overbroad, vague, or ambiguous. Language is
inherently imprecise. 6' As with any code, inevitably there will be gaps and
within its informed discretion, whether to proceed by rulemaking or
adjudication .... "[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of
the administrative agency."
394 U.S. at 772 (footnotes omitted) (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 332 U.S.
194, 203 (1947)). At least one commentator agreed:
Itwould have been much wiser to recognize, as did Mr. Justice Black, that the
definitional scheme in the APA provides no more than a general description of
agency process. "Rulemaking" embraces a proceeding which is "open ended in
form, specifying only the class of persons or practices that will come within its
scope." "Adjudication" encompasses proceedings "directed at least in part at
determining the legal status of persons who are named as parties, or the acts or
practices of those persons." While the differing procedural requisites of each reflect
their tendency to serve different functions, both are integral parts of the regulatory
process, hedged in either case with considerable safeguards appropriate to the mode
of proceeding. So long as the agency does not abuse either process, the traditional
importance of administrative flexibility suggests that the agency should be allowed
to proceed in the mode most appropriate to the problem.
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7,225-26 (1969).
60. PIERCE, supra note 7, § 6.8, at 267.
61. As Justice Felix Frankfurter recognized:
Anything that is written may present a problem of meaning, and that is the essence
of the business of judges in construing legislation. The problem derives from the
very nature of words. They are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathematical
symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom
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omissions. Courts and agencies must fill those gaps. At times, the only
way those gaps will become apparent is in the context of an adjudication,
and the way those gaps may best be addressed is with the benefit of a full
factual record. Fundamentally, regulatory drafters are not prescient,62 and
they cannot always anticipate and address all potential ensuing
63
possibilities.
A different holding in Chenery I might also have resulted in less
desirable rules. A holding requiring agencies to create advance rules might
have forced agencies to commit themselves to specific rules with particular
64
courses of action without knowing all the facts in advance.
As a result,
agencies would be forced to produce extremely detailed regulations
anticipating and addressing every potential situation that might arise. If
agencies were to overlook any potential problem, they would be precluded
from addressing the problem adjudicatively.6 5
Third, requiring agencies to develop all rules legislatively would deprive
the agency of the ability to make tailored decisions in incremental fashion.
Adjudication allows agency officials to "extend policy no further than
needed to dispose of the issues at hand.",66 If agencies could only issue
rules legislatively, then they would always have to craft rules in a factual
67
vacuum.
attains more than approximate precision. If individual words are inexact symbols,
with shifting variables, their configuration can hardly achieve invariant meaning or
assured definiteness.
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528
(1947).
62. See Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: An
Overview, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 681, 693 (1984).
63. See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400 (1950); see
also J.A. Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretationof Statutes, 1 U. TORONTO L.J.
286, 289-90 (1936); Frankfurter, supra note 61, at 539-40; Frank E. Horack, Jr., In the
Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W. VA. L. REV. 119, 121 (1932); Quintin Johnstone, An
Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1954);
James Landis, A Note On "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888 (1930);
Warren Lehman, How To Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 489, 500 (1979);
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870-71 (1930).
64. See Chenery 11, 332 U.S. at 202 (suggesting that administrative agencies should
have the flexibility to act either through adjudication or through legislation).
65. Weaver, Retrospective, supra note 2, at 171.
66. Diver, supra note 3, at 403.
67. The Court in Chenery II recognized all of these concerns:
[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not
reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a
relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a
particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast
rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be
impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those situations,
the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-to-case basis if
the administrative process is to be effective.
332 U.S. at 202-03.
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Additional concerns would arise in a non-Chenery II world. When
existing statutes or regulations fail to address a problem adequately, agency
personnel must do so. When there is time, they can do so by informal rule.
But there is not always enough time, and informal procedures are not
cheap. Notice and comment rulemaking has become both a timeconsuming and expensive process. 68 If an interpretive problem arises in a
case, it may be impossible or impractical to use informal processes.
Moreover, adjudicative "rules," unlike legislative rules, can be applied
retroactively, 69 so that a new rule can be applied in the case under
consideration. In spite of these arguments, "Courts and commentators have
accepted adjudicative policymaking despite these persuasive arguments
because they recognize the operational sensitivity and individualizing
impact of interstitial adjudicative policy development and the dynamic
force adjudications add to the administrative policy arsenal. 70
Requiring a prior rule as a predicate to agency action may negatively
impact the interaction between agencies and regulated agencies. At
present, if regulated entities are uncertain about regulatory requirements,
they are expected to go to the agency and request clarification. 7 1 This
process helps inform the agency that there is a problem. If a prior rule
were required, these entities would have no incentive to seek clarification.
Rather, they would have a disincentive because the agency might respond
to their request by creating an undesirable rule, with which the regulated
entity would then be forced to comply. Instead, if the entity did nothing,

68. Some argue that the extensiveness of the requirements has led to ossification. See
generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1385-87 (1992). In some cases, Congress has required additional
procedures to legislative rulemaking, adding expense and time-consuming processes. DAVIS
& PIERCE, supra note 2, § 7.11, at 363.
69. See Chenery II,332 U.S. at 203 (holding both that the application of an
adjudicatory rule may have "a retroactive effect" that is not "fatal to its validity" under the
Due Process Clause and that each case of "first impression" has some retroactive effect
regardless of whether an administrative agency or a court "announces the new principle");
Sewell Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 686 F.2d 1066, 1070
(4th Cir. 1982) ("[R]etroactive application of a novel principle expounded in an
adjudicatory proceeding does not infringe the rights secured by the due process clause.").
70. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 29 ADMIN.
& REG. L. NEWS 2 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/
adlaw-spring2004.pdf.
71. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 64
(1984) ("As a participant in the Medicare program, respondent had a duty to familiarize
itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement."); Emery Mining Corp. v. Sec'y
of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411, 1416 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Particularly where mandatory safety
standards are concerned, a mine operator must be charged with knowledge of the Act's
provisions and has a duty to comply with those provisions."); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585
F.2d 1327, 1337 (6th Cir. 1978); Saint Francis Mem. Hosp. v. United States, 648 F.2d 1305,
13 11 (Ct. Cl. 1981) ("Plaintiff should, at the least, have made an inquiry to its intermediary
or the Secretary, seeking clarification or amplification of the statute and regulations.").
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the agency would not be able to prohibit the entity from doing as it wished,
at least until the agency discovered the problem, because there would be no
rule prohibiting the conduct.72
CONCLUSION

In arguing that Chenery H was inevitable, we do not mean to suggest that
it is generally preferable for administrative agencies to articulate rules by
adjudicative means. On the contrary, for the reasons suggested earlier, we
recognize that informal procedures are preferable to adjudicative
procedures for the formulation and announcement of generally applicable,
prospective rules. Agencies are not the repositories of all wisdom; they can
learn from the input of regulated individuals and entities.73
And although courts extol the virtues of informal procedures, they
routinely hold that agencies have broad discretion regarding the procedures
at their disposal. After Chenery II and Wyman-Gordon, legislative and
adjudicative procedures essentially are alternative methods of creating
policy because neither commands judicial preference or mandate.7 4
Despite extensive scholarly criticism and commentary, the decision in
Chenery 11 was correct. Even if administrative officials wanted to
articulate all policy legislatively, it would be impossible for them to do so.
Some case-by-case development is a necessary and inevitable part of
administrative policymaking. By recognizing this fact, and giving agencies
discretion over whether to articulate policy legislatively or adjudicatively,
Chenery H had a major impact on the development of the administrative
process.
In short, a world in which agencies could not create policy adjudicatively
would look much different. Agencies would be less able to do their jobs.
They would be unable to address the situation before them efficiently,
effectively, or appropriately. Moreover, the Code of Federal Regulations
would balloon in size and complexity as agencies tried to anticipate and
72.

Weaver, Retrospective, supra note 2, at 171-72.

73.

Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. at 778-79 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

74.

See R.L. Inv. Ltd. Partners v. INS, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1026 (D. Hi. 2000)

(holding that the INS's requirements amount to a new rule, which it could have initiated
through adjudication), affd, 273 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2001); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (stating that the "views expressed in Chenery H and WymanGordon" showed that the Board was not prevented from announcing a new rule in an
adjudicative proceeding, and that the choice between legislation and adjudication belonged
to the Board); Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244, 1251 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 980 (1979); American Mach. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1321, 1330 (5th Cir. 1970)
("[Wihen an administrative agency makes law as a legislature would, it must follow the
rulemaking procedure.., and when it makes law as a court would, it must follow the
adjudicative procedure ... whether to use one method of law making or the other is a
question of judgment, not of power." (quoting NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899,
905 (2d Cir. 1963)).
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address every possible contingency. Additionally, regulated entities might
have a disincentive to work cooperatively with the agency to ensure that
the best rule is adopted. Thus, agencies would be overburdened and
ineffective. A contrary decision would have, as the Court recognized in
Chenery II, "stultified" the administrative process.

